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LEGISLATION
The Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act of July 16, 1941.1
The Pennsylvania Legislature unsuccessfully attempted by Acts passed
in 1934, 2 1935 ' and 1937,4 to provide that mortgage deficiency judgments r
i. Pa. Laws 1941, no. 151. "An Act-To protect the debtors, obligors or guar-
antors of debts for which judgments are entered, or may be entered, and owners of
real estate affected thereby, and others indirectly liable for the payment thereof, by
prescribing the method of fixing the fair market value of such property sold on execu-
tion, and limiting the amount collectible thereafter on such judgments." See note
(I941) 16 TEMiP. L. Q. 72.
2. 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1940 Supp.) § 8o6.
3. 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i940 Supp.) §§ 808-820.
4. 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1940 Supp.) §§ 82xa-82IL.
5. Actually, there is no separate judgment known as a deficiency judgment in
Pennsylvania. When the mortgage is foreclosed by a writ of sci. fa. (an in rein
(330)
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be measured by the difference between the amount of the debt and the fair
market value 6 of the real estate executed upon. These bills were passed
to remedy the inequities of the rule arising out of Wolfe's Appeal 7 and
Lomison v. Faust," that the price obtained at the sheriff's sale presumably
reflected the value of the real estate involved, which presumption was not
rebuttable.9
Under the Act of 1934, the mortgagee or other interested party was
required to petition the court within six months after foreclosure, to fix the
"fair value" 10 of the realty sold. In absence of such petition, the debtor
could have the prothonotary enter satisfaction of the judgment on the rec-
ord. The Act was to remain in effect only until July I, 1935, and applied
whether or not the mortgagee purchased the realty on foreclosure. In
Beaver Co. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, a mortgagee entered
judgment on a mortgage bond given before the Act and then bought in at
the execution sale.12 Justice Stern speaking for the majority, declared that
the Act, since it subsequently changed the method of enforcing prior mort-
gages to the detriment of the mortgagees involved, violated provisions of
both the Federal Is and State 14 Constitutions prohibiting impairment of
obligation of contract. This, because the law on enforcement of mort-
gages existing at the time the mortgage was given was considered a part
of the contract.15 Further, the changes to be effected were not procedural
but rather substantive, since the rights of the mortgagee were less valuable
after the Act than before it.'6  The late Justice Barnes, in dissenting,
maintained that the mortgagor's basic undertaking was merely to pay the
debt in full, that the Act was directed against a procedure requiring the
mortgagor, after he had paid in full, whether with property or money, to
pay additional sums on the debt, and that this did not violate any consti-
tutional prohibitions against impairment of obligation of contract. 8
The 1935 Act, passed before the Winowich case reached the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, was by its terms, a continuation of the 1934 Act, in
turn to expire on June 30, 1937. This Act though similar to its predeces-
sor, was more elaborate, clarifying many points omitted in the earlier stat-
ute. There was however, one significant change. The mortgagee was
proceeding), and the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, an in per-
sonaM judgment must be obtained on the bond debt or on covenants in the mortgage,
etc. This latter is the deficiency judgment. When, however, a judgment on the bond
is obtained first, there may be execution on that same judgment until it is satisfied.
That part of the judgment still unsatisfied after an execution sale is also known
as the deficiency judgment See 13 STANDARD PA. PRACTICE (1939) 6o3, 6o6, 674
et seq.
6. The term "fair value" was used in the 1934 Act, but this was interpreted in
Market Street National Bank v. Huff, 319 Pa. 286, 179 A. 582 (1935), to mean "fair
market value" at the time of the sale.
7. 1O Pa. 126, 20 A. 410 (1885).
8. 145 Pa. 8, 23 A. 377 (1892).
9. See I LADNER, REAL ESTATE CONVEYANCING (2d ed. 1941) § ioi-C.
io. See note 6 supra.
I. 323 Pa. 483, 187 A. 481 (936).
12. All cases discussed herein involve a mortgagee who bought in at the fore-
closure sale.
13. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § io:
"No State shall-pass any-Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts..
14. PA. CoNsT. Art. I § 17:
"No-law impairing the obligation of contracts-shall be passed."
15. 323 Pa. 483, 489, 187 A. 481, 484 (1936).
16. 323 Pa. 483, 493, 187 A. 481, 486 (1936).
17. 323 Pa. 483, 515, 187 A. 921 (1936).
I8. It will be noted that the Act was never held unconstitutional as to mortgages
entered into after passage of the Act and executed on during its existence.
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required to proceed first against the mortgaged property before attaching
any of the debtor's other real estate, or the real estate or personalty of any
other person. This provision was manifestly intended to prevent avoidance
of the statute by removing opportunities 19 for satisfying any part of the
bond before foreclosing on the real estate securing the debt. Knox v.
Noggle 20 held the 1935 Act unconstitutional as to mortgages entered into
prior to the Act on the grounds advanced in the Winowich case.21 In
H. 0. L. C. v. Edwards,22 the Act was held inapplicable whether the mort-
gage was given prior or subsequent to the Act. Requiring the mortgagee
to proceed first against the mortgaged property, and then limiting him to
a deficiency judgment based on the fair market value of the property was
considered an anomalous discrimination against mortgage creditors, con-
travening Article III, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,22 since general
creditors could, after judgment, execute as formerly on any of the debtor's
property, and obtain a deficiemcy judgment without the limitations imposed
on mortgage creditors by the 1935 Act.
The 1937 Act, again temporary, required the mortgagee either to
release those personally liable on the mortgage debt, or petition the court
to set the fair market value of the mortgaged real estate before executing
on a mortgage or on a judgment entered on any obligation secured by a
mortgage. If the price set wasn't bid at the sheriff's sale, the court could
either permit the highest bidder to take the property or postpone disposal
of the same up to two years. In Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott,2 4 the defendant
prothonotary had refused to issue a writ of execution on a judgment entered
on a mortgage bond after passage of the 1937 Act, because the execution
plaintiff had not complied therewith. In this case, as in the Edwards case
supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the Act violated the Consti-
tutional prohibition against special legislation.2 5
After the Scott and Edwards cases, there were no further attempts by
the local legislature to correct the deficiency judgment law until the passage
of the 1941 Act, which probably would not have been considered if it were
not for certain recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachoviza Bank & T. Co.,
2 6
the United States Supreme Court upheld a North Carolina statute 27 per-
mitting the mortgagor to set off against the debt the fair value of the mort-
gaged property executed on in an action for a deficiency. The statute was
only to apply where the property was sold at a private sale (under a power
given in the mortgage) to the mortgagee. Moreover, the statute did not
affect the mortgagee's alternate remedy of foreclosing by a bill in equity.
Under this alternate procedure, however, the chancellor could control the
deficiency judgment by setting aside the sae on the ground of inadequacy
ig. The mortgagee could have evidently evaded this Act by executing first on the
personalty of the mortgage debtor.
20. 328 Pa., 302, 196 A. 18 (1938).
21. The Court cited Shallcross v. North Branch-Sedgwick B. & L., 123 Pa. Super.
593, 187 A. 819 (936), with approval, not going into any independent reasoning.
The Stallcross case, however, was based on the Witowich case.
22. 329 Pa. 529, 198 A. 123 (938).
23. "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: . . .provid-
ing or changing methods for the collection of debts or the enforcing of judgments, or
prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate: . .
24. 329 Pa. 534, 198 A. 115 (938).
25. Actually, the reasoning of the Court was set forth in full in the Scott case,
the court merely citing that case in the Edwards case. Both cases were decided the
same day.
26. 300 U. S. 124 (1937).
27. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 2593 (d).
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of price. Justice Roberts found no violation of Article I, § io of the Fed-
eral Constitution. 29 He employed the reasoning advanced in Justice
Barnes' dissent in the Winowich case to the effect that the principal under-
taking of the mortgage contract was to pay the debt in full, and that this
was not impaired.
The next two cases, Honeyman v. Hanan 2 9 and Honeyrnan v.
Jacobs 30 involved temporary amendments to the New York Civil Practice
Act.81 The amendments provided that for the period of the emergency, in
any action on a mortgage debt contracted prior to July I, 1932, whether
in a foreclosure action or not, the defendant could set off the fair market
value of the mortgaged property, and that the deficiency judgment must
be obtained in the foreclosure action itself if that was brought first. The
action for a deficiency judgment in Honeyman v,. Hanan 82 was dismissed
because it was brought after the foreclosure action. The case was decided
under the Act, but it was not necessary to consider the constitutionality of
permitting a set off of the fair market value of real estate foreclosed where
the mortgage antedated the amendments. But the Jacobs case squarely
raised this question, being an appeal from a decision in a foreclosure action
refusing a deficiency judgment because of a finding that the property
involved was worth at least as much as the debt. The Supreme Court
upheld the amendments, citing the Wachovia Bank case. Meanwhile, the
New York Civil Practice Act, on the strength of the Wachovia Bank case,
had been pernumently amended 83 to permit, on appropriate motion, the
court in determining the amount of the deficiency judgment to deduct the
fair market value of the property from the mortgage debt, no matter when
contracted. Gelfert v. National City Bank,84 in holding this statute con-
stitutional reversed the New York Court of Appeals, 8 citing the Wachovia
Bank and Jacobs cases. It rejected the theory of the New York court that a
statute of this type was constitutional where limited to the period of an
emergency, but unconstitutional if not so restricted. In this Gelfert case,
execution plaintiff had obtained judgment subsequent to the permanent
amendment to the New York Act on a mortgage entered into prior to the
amendment, but after July 1, 1932.86 The Supreme Court expressly
excluded from consideration validity of the statute in a case where the
mortgagee was not the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
In view of these United States Supreme Court decisions, the holding
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Winowich case that the 1934
Act violated Article I, § io of the Federal Constitution 37 could no longer
be maintained. While Federal opinions could not impair 8 the Pennsyl-
vania court's construction of Article I, § 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
28. See note 13 supra.
29. 302 U. S. 375 (1937).
30. 3o6 U. S. 539 (I939).
31. § 1o83a Civil Practice Act of New York. Cf. THompsoN's LAws OF N. Y.
(1939, part II) 1761.
32. 302 U. S. 375 (1937).
33. § io83 Civil Practice Act of Neew York. Cf. THompsoN's LAWs OF N. Y.
(i939 part II) 1761.
34. 313 U. S. 221 (i941).
35. Sub oin. National City Bank v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 13, 29 N. E. (2d) 449
(940).
36. The temporary deficiency judgment act-(cf. note 31 supra)-was still in
effect, but it applied only to mortgages before July I, 1932, so that it would not have
affected the mortgage in question.
37. See note 13 supra.
38. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Allen, C. C. P. No. 6 of Phila., Co., No.
3852 June Term, 1941.
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tion, 9 notwithstanding the fact that it closely follows Article I, § Io of the
Federal Constitution," they were strongly persuasive. Relying on these
federal cases, the 1941 Deficiency Judgment Act again attempted to affect
deficiency judgments on obligations entered into before the effective date
of the Act. This Act provides:
A. Where real estate sold in any execution proceedings was pur-
chased directly or indirectly by the execution plaintiff, said plain-
tiff must within six months of the sale bring a petition to fix the
fair value of the property, which value is to measure the deficiency
judgment. Otherwise, the whole debt shall be discharged.
B. If the sale had been effected before the Act, then the above men-
tioned petition must be made within six months after the effective
date of this Act, to wit, on or before January 16, 1942.41
C. The petition, which must be signed and sworn to by the plaintiff,
shall contain a statement of the fair value of the real estate fore-
closed. If no answer is filed, or if an answer is filed controverting
plaintiff's statement of fair value but is unsupported by testimony
at the hearing, then a deficiency judgment shall be granted on the
basis of the plaintiff's statement of value.
D. If the Act cannot be constitutionally applied to sales prior thereto,
then it should apply only to sales after the Act; or if the Act can-
not be applied to sales after the Act on obligations arising prior
thereto, then it shall be applied only to obligations arising after
the Act.
As is clear from the provisions outlined in A, this Act applies to all
executions on real estate, without reference to whether or not they stem
from judgments in personam, and whether or not the judgment in per-
sonam arose out of an obligation secured by real estate. This meets the
special legislation objection to the 1937 Act.42 Judge Flood of the Phila-
delphia Common Pleas Court recently so held in Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co.
v. Allen." In this case, the plaintiffs had evidently foreclosed on a mort-
gage by writ of sci. fa. in 1935, and had bought in the property for $50.
In 1941, after passage of the instant Act, they attempted to obtain a judg-
ment in personam on a mortgage extension agreement for the deficiency
without first petitioning the court to fix the fair market value of the real
estate sold, on the theory that the Act was unconstitutional. It is quite
evident from A and B supra that the provisions of the 1934 Act held in the
Winowich case to be an impairment of the obligation of contract were
incorporated into the 1941 Act. For this reason, the lower court in the
Allen case "regretfully" held the Act unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a per curianz opinion,44
with one Justice dissenting, reversed the lower court in order "to preserve
identity of construction of the contract clauses of both State and Federal
Constitutions", citing the Gelfert case. Justice Stern who had written the
majority opinion in the Winowzich case, concurred in a separate opinion,
taking the occasion to explain his change in position. He points out that
39. See note 14 mspra.
40. See note 13 spra.
41. Based on the statutory rule for computation of time. Cf. 46 PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) § 555.
42. Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 329 Pa. 534, 198 A. 115 (1938).
43. See note 38 supra.
44. Phila. Legal Intel. p. I col. 4, Dec. I, 1941.
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at the time of the Winowich decision, all states45 passing on the question,
except New York, had held such statutes unconstitutional and that since
then New York 46 has come into accord with Pennsylvania and other states.
Yet the Pennsylvania court in the Winowich case had discussed and relied
in the main on opinions of the United States Supreme Court.47 Now that
the latter court had, in the Gelfert case, departed from its previous posi-
tion, the Pennsylvania court, still following the Federal Court was doing
the same.
The per curiam opinion in Fidelity-Phii. Trust Co. v. Allen 4 s empha-
sizes that as no question is raised as to the application of the Act to sales
on judgments in personrm made prior to its effective date, no opinion on
the subject is expressed. In other words, if the mortgage was foreclosed
by entering a judgment on the mortgage bond and execution was had on
the property with partial satisfaction entered on the basis of the proceeds
of the sheriff's sale, or if there was a foreclosure by writ of sci. fa., and if
subsequently, but before the Act a deficiency judgment on the bond was
entered, holders of such deficiency judgments might not have to comply
with the Act before executing on them. Indeed, cases were cited to the
effect that legislation which purports to detract from the enforcement of
existing judgments is unconstitutional. 9 No answer to these cases is
afforded by the recent federal opinions discussed above, as the question was
never raised there. Nevertheless, it is felt that a precedent does exist,
which would permit the Pennsylvania courts to arrive at the result of the
Allen case if they were so inclined.
According to Williston's account,50 a point was reached in English law
when equity enjoined the enforcement of judgments as unconscientious,
i. e., those on penal bonds beyond the true damages suffered by the obligee.
The Pennsylvania courts might likewise refuse to enforce prior judgments
which in fact have been satisfied with valuable property bought in at the
execution sale. It is true that the courts in Pennsylvania are generally
regarded as having only such equity powers as are conferred on them by
statute.51 If, perchance, it can be contended that no prior statute would
enable the courts to refuse to enforce a judgment, the 1941 Deficiency Act
itself might be construed to confer the necessary power. If it is objected
that such action would deprive certain creditors of vested rights without
due process of law, it might be answered that the court is not required to
define as a vested right,5 2 a remedy which enables a creditor to collect more
than the debt.
EFFECTS OF THE ACT
A. On Debtors with Ample Funds
This group will not be affected to any substantial extent, nor was it
intended otherwise. Its members were fully protected even before the Act,
since they would normally employ their resources to pay their debts when
due. But if they did default, they could bid up the property executed on
to its full value and thus avoid loss.
45. See note I of the concurring opinion of Justice Stern in the Allen case.
46. National City Bank v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 13, 29, N. E. (2d) 449 (194o). This
was the case that was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
47. See Beaver Co. B. & L. v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 497-502, 187 A. 481, 493-
494 (1936).
48. Phila. Legal Intel. p. I col. 4. December I, 1941.
49. See per curiam opinion in the Allen case.
50. 3 WILLISTON, Co NmAcrs (1936 ed.) §§ 774, 775.
51. Hogsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, lol A. 941 (1917).
52. See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 17 n. 3.
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B. On Debtors wi'th Other Property But No Funds
These parties will probably derive the greatest benefit from the Act.
Prior thereto, being without funds, they could neither pay their debts nor
protect their equities in properties executed upon by bidding them up.
They could, it is true, have petitioned the court to set aside the sale if the
price bid was grossly inadequate.5 Or if the creditor took the property
on a nominal bid, they could bargain for an agreeable settlement of the
debt by threatening to petition to have the sale set aside. But where the
price bid was not sufficiently low to amount to gross inadequacy of price,
yet well below fair market value, the debtor suffered a loss against which
he had no protection. Under the 1941 Act, he is enabled to eliminate this
loss when as is usual, the mortgagee buys in.
I
C. On Debtors Who Were Judgment Proof at an Execution Sale Prior to
the Act, But Are No Longer So Situated
Since it is probable that only a small percentage of the present unsatis-
fied execution plaintiffs will file the "fair market value" petition by January
16, 1942, the debts of many in this classification will automatically be wiped
out in full. But where the unsatisfied creditor does enter his petition in
time to comply with the Act, his deficiency judgment (barring any future
limitation on the application of the Act) will be limited to the difference
between the fair market value of the realty at the time sold and the debt.
D. On Debtors Who Were Judgment Proof at an Execution Sale Prior to
the Act, and Still Are
Under this heading may also be included debtors who shall be judg-
ment proof at a sale after the Act. Of course, an unfair judgment cannot
harm a permanently judgment proof debtor. Hence, the following consid-
erations apply only to those who shall again acquire property.
The Act may not prove very beneficial in these cases. Where a debtor
has met with demoralizing financial reverses, as is quite common in periods
of panic and depression, and lacks hope of financial improvement in a fore-
seeable future, he will not bother to answer the creditor's petition stating
the value of the debtor's realty sold by the sheriff. Even if such a debtor
would contest the creditor's valuation, practically he can not when utterly
without funds or other resources. Of course, the petition stating the fair
market value must be sworn to by the plaintiff so that if the value stated
by him is so low that he could not have believed it, he subjects himself to
liability of conviction for perjury.5 4 Yet the protection this affords is
slight " for, if the value stated by the execution plaintiff, shall be above
that low at which it was plainly perjurous and it is not contested, the credi-
tor's statement of fair value will stand, as the Act declares that the court
shall give a deficiency judgment based on a plaintiff's uncontested valua-
tion. Armed with such a judgment, the creditor can hopefully look for-
ward to a satisfaction of the judgment if and when the debtor's fortunes
improve. This condition might in part be obviated if the courts scrutinized
unanswered petitions and required the petitioner to include the assessed
53. Hettler v. Shephard, 326 Pa. 165, 191 A 581 (1937).
54. i8 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941 Supp.) § 4322.
55. As to the difficulty of proving perjury on a matter which involves personal
judgment, see 21 R. C. L. (1918) 254.
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valuation of the real estate along with the required statement of fair market
value. The former figure could have no binding effect, but it might tend
to discourage too bold-faced a discrepancy, unless the petitioner honestly
believed it justified. Such court control, however, may prove impractical,
for when it is needed most, i. e., during a panic, it might place an intolerable
burden on the courts.
E. On Judgment Creditors
Gains of the judgment debtor set forth above will be losses to the judg-
ment creditor. However, in the mortgage field at least, private mortgagees
generally did not further pursue their mortgagors when the property taken
over was roughly worth the amount of the debt, even though they had the
legal right to do so. It is true that the Act does burden enforcement of
judgments after the first execution on realty, as the execution plaintiff may
be put to his proof of his statement of fair market value. But this burden
is not believed excessive in view of the check it provides against oversatis-
faction of debts.
There is, however, at least one more method, not mentioned above,
whereby judgment creditors may still accomplish oversatisfaction despite
the Act. A careful reading of the Act will disclose that a mortgagee who
holds a bond and mortgage may enter judgment on the bond and execute
on personalty of the mortgagor until the debt is nearly satisfied. Then the
real estate mortgaged may be sold to satisfy the same unsatisfied judgment
which was obtained on the bond, and if there are no other bidders, the
mortgagee may take the property for the sheriff's costs. The Act does not
attempt to prevent oversatisfaction of a judgment debt through the creditor's
buying in personalty executed upon below its fair value, nor through buy-
ing in the realty after partial satisfaction on personalty.
CONCLUSIONS
It is apparently settled by Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. Allen" that the
Act will apply to all executions on realty after the Act, even if the judg-
ment was obtained beforehand, and thus fair value petitions must be filed
within six. months after execution sales. Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v.
Allen,57 itself, holds that the fair value petition must be filed, where there
has been an execution on judgment in rein prior to the Act, before a defi-
ciency judgment in peisonarn on the same debt will be granted after the
Act. It is felt that the Act should apply where there was an execution
sale on judgments in personam prior to the Act, possibly on the theory
advanced above, in order to release all past as well as future judgment
debtors from liability to twice satisfying a debt. Indeed, it seems anomalous
to permit the application or non-application of the 1941 Act to the evil in
question to turn on what method of foreclosure was employed, and it is
anticipated, although not too confidently, that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will adopt the same view.
J. A. E., 3rd.
56. Phila. Legal Intel, p. i col. 4, December I, 1941.
57. Ibid.
